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Abstract: In his article “Illness, Disability, and Ethical Life Writing,” G. Thomas Couser discusses illness
and disability as related to ethical Life Writing. Since the issues came to his attention in the early 1990s,
narratives of illness and disability have continued to proliferate in the US. And today, even as psychiatry
moves away from narrative therapy toward drug therapy, narrative competence is being emphasized in
the treatment of non-mental illness. Whether inside or outside the clinic, narratives of illness and
disability can be in and of themselves restorative, if not healing. And yet, the production of such
narratives is not without ethical pitfalls. Professional ethics do not necessarily prevent violation of privacy
or other harms.
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G. Thomas COUSER
Illness, Disability, and Ethical Life Writing
Since they came to my attention in the early 1990s, narratives of illness and disability have continued
to proliferate in the US. And today, even as psychiatry moves away from narrative therapy toward drug
therapy, narrative competence is being emphasized in the treatment of non-mental illness—at least by
some (notably Rita Charon, who has advocated for what she calls “narrative medicine”).
This is all to the good. In her introduction to Depression and Narrative: Telling the Dark, Hilary Clark
said it well: “We should listen to personal narratives of illness and disability—really attending to them
on their own merits, as opposed to using them in order to come to diagnoses and impose regimes of
treatment—because such narratives give voice to the ill, the traumatized, and the disabled, those trying
to make sense of catastrophic interruptions or shifts in their lives and help them navigate the
bewildering, impersonal context of medical diagnosis and treatment.” (3)
Of course, such narratives are hardly limited to the clinic. Indeed, I have argued that in the US, the
memoir boom coincided with, and to some extent was driven by, the rise of what I have dubbed the
“some body memoir.” Not the somebody memoir—the story of a celebrity. Rather, the story of a hitherto
unknown person—a nobody—who has an anomalous somatic condition. Here are some conditions that
have been the subjects of memoirs in the twenty years or so: amputation, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease), anorexia, anxiety, autism spectrum disorders, bipolar illness,
borderline personality disorder, bulimia, cerebral palsy, chronic fatigue syndrome, chronic pain, cystic
fibrosis, deformity, depression, diabetes, epilepsy, insomnia, locked-in syndrome, Lyme disease,
multiple sclerosis, Munchausen syndrome by proxy, obesity, obsessive-compulsive disorder, Parkinson’s
disease, prosopagnosia (face-blindness), schizophrenia, stuttering, stroke, Tourette syndrome, and
vitiligo. Indeed, one might say that illness narrative has been something of an American literary
epidemic of late. Whether inside or outside the clinic, such narratives can be in and of themselves
restorative, if not healing.
Nevertheless, as I argued in Vulnerable Subjects: Ethics and Life Writing, the representation of illness
and disability in memoir and autobiography is not without dangers. My subtitle, “Ethics and Life Writing,”
implies a very broad scope, but my primary concern was with subjects vulnerable to exploitation or
misrepresentation by virtue of their being ill or disabled and sometimes, as a result, not able to represent
themselves. My method was to adapt to the ethics of life writing a version of biomedical ethics known
as Principlism, as set forth in a classic text, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, by Tom Beauchamp and
James Childress. I was concerned primarily with texts whose subjects are rendered vulnerable by their
relation to those who write about them. One category of such individuals is disabled children who are
the subjects of parental narratives. Another category is located at the other end of life: aged and
demented parents, whose predicament is the focus of a fast-growing niche narrative, the Alzheimer’s
memoir, typically written by a child who has served as a care-giver. Here we see a common linkage
among healthcare, authorship, and authority; the writer claims authority on the basis of care-giving.
This is an obvious and legitimate basis of authority, but it is not without complications.
According to my ethical schema, just as physicians are charged with not harming their patients, life
writers should be concerned with not harming subjects with whom they are embedded in intimate and
trust-based relationships. And just as physicians are obliged to honor their patients’ autonomy, life
writers should honor their subjects’ autonomy, involving them in the process to the greatest extent
possible. Finally, just as physicians are urged to be open with patients, so life writers should be
transparent about their methods, processes, and personal benefits.
In Vulnerable Subjects I spent a good deal of space surveying the oeuvre of Oliver Sacks and offering
a mild critique of his writing, which, though, empathetic is rarely informed by the insights of disability
studies. I also examined what I call “death-writing”—euthanasia narratives, which typically justify the
act on the grounds of poor quality of life. And I branched out from such obvious scenarios to the way
anyone’s life may be written by their DNA, which can reveal potentially harmful and costly genetic
anomalies. To date, most of us are not compelled to submit our DNA to anyone, but it can be easily
accessed without our permission or even our knowledge. In a sense, then, we are all vulnerable subjects.
Keeping that in mind should encourage us to respect the autonomy of those who are rendered especially
so by dint of the anomalous condition of their bodies and minds.
What, then, are some dangers inherent in writing about vulnerable individuals? What may
compromise this enterprise? When and how might it have unintended and unfortunate consequences?
Consider the following history of a case study. After I spoke at an American university on an unrelated
topic a few years ago, a graduate student I’ll call Julia approached me with her story. At the age of
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seven, Julia was operated on for a significant physical anomaly that required ongoing medical attention.
To help her cope with this regimen, she was sent to a therapist. Nearly two decades later, learning that
the therapist had been appointed to a prestigious academic post, Julia looked her up online, out of
curiosity. The therapist’s résumé listed an article Julia guessed was about her; reading it confirmed her
suspicion.
She found the experience deeply unsettling. With her permission, I cited her story in an op-ed in
Virtual Mentor, the online ethics journal of the American Medical Association; I called my essay “The
Case History and Deferred Pain.” (The term “deferred pain” obviously puns on referred pain, the medical
term for pain that is felt somewhere other than its source. Referred pain is displaced in space; deferred
pain—such as the belated pain felt by Julia—is displaced in time.)
This anecdote illustrates, for starters, how the internet has shrunk our world. We all have less privacy
than ever before, and it is ever easier to trace others and references to ourselves. Scenarios such as
Julia’s, however, do not require the internet: in 2001 a psychotherapy patient queried the New York
Times ethics columnist after discovering what he believed to be his case narrative while randomly
browsing in a bookstore.
These stories reveal that even when authors of case studies may think they have concealed the
identity of their patients, there is no guarantee that patients will not recognize themselves should they
happen upon their own narratives. And such recognition is very likely to cause them discomfort.
These therapists presumably thought they had done everything required by professional ethics.
Perhaps they had. Julia was too young to grant consent; rather than seeking it from her parents as
proxies, the therapist concealed her identity behind a pseudonym. Moreover, Julia’s youth may have led
her therapist to discount the likelihood of her reading the article. But eventually she did, and she readily
recognized it as her case. And she felt somehow violated, or betrayed.
Ironically, the adoption of narrative medicine may increase the likelihood of scenarios like this. With
this approach—which, according to Rita Charon, elicits “accounts of self… that include emotional,
familial, aspirational, creative aspects of the self”—a physician’s relation to her patients approaches that
of a psychotherapist (“Listening”). As I said earlier, this may serve the patients’ interests; such is the
aim (and claim) of narrative medicine. But greater knowledge of patients’ lives also facilitates the writing
of case studies that may result in self-recognition and feelings of violation of privacy. Indeed, at the
2011 MLA convention, Rita herself noted the danger inherent in narrative medicine. Her title--“Listening,
Telling, Suffering, and Carrying On: Reflexive Practice or Health Imperialism?”--indicates the prospect
that, rather than empowering patients, this approach may extend clinicians’ power over them. It may
thus increase the risk of what I call “deferred iatrogenic pain”—suffering inflicted on patients not by
their treatment but by the narratives of that treatment.
The point is that ethical guidelines do not guarantee that case histories will not cause pain to their
subjects. Such pain may not rise to the level of clinical “harm,” and thus the clinicians may not have
violated the precept to do no harm. But in Julia’s case, the pain was far from negligible, despite being
long delayed. More to the point, it may have been avoidable.
Or maybe not: it may not always be possible to conceal patients’ identities from them. The rarer the
case, the more publishable it is. And the very details that warrant its narration may enable patients to
recognize themselves. In any event, among all the potential readers of case studies, patients are
uniquely equipped to know the identifying details and, of course, who provided treatment. They may
resent the presumption of authorship on the part of care-givers.
Even if their rights have not been violated, the question is whether their discomfort is outweighed
by the benefits of the narrative. The question then becomes, cui bono? Who benefits? Who profits?
Presumably, the goal of writing case histories is to advance the understanding of particular conditions
and improve treatment. In principle, then, the case history serves the welfare of all--public health. At
the same time, there are undeniable benefits to the author in committing a case to print. Doing so can
build a reputation and advance a career--and lead to monetary gain. Consider Oliver Sacks, the world’s
most famous neurologist, whose fame and fortune are based not on his clinical practice or contributions
to neurology but on his nonclinical case studies of unusual syndromes. So the writing of case studies
may entail an inherent conflict of interest: authors stand to gain from them in a way that is not true for
their subjects. This could affect their judgment of the medical benefits of such projects.
I cannot speak for Julia; indeed, she herself is not sure just why she was so troubled by reading her
case. But my sense is that a patient’s discomfort may be a function of the intrinsic disparity between
the patient’s and the clinician’s relations to a case. The patient comes to the clinician in hope of help-of care, if not of cure. To the professional, however, the patient represents an instance of something
beyond herself; with specialists, the condition is often one in which the professional has an intellectual
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interest, or even a research program. The hurt caused by a patient’s self-recognition may arise from
the feeling that one has been reduced to one’s condition and thereby objectified.
What disappoints and offends a patient who reads her own case narrative, then, may be the discovery
that she is not just a person, or even a patient, but also a case--indeed a case of--to her therapist or
physician. The psychotherapist Ruthellen Josselson has acknowledged this. Confronted with clients’
negative reactions to their case histories, she came to this realization: “I [had], in a sense, been talking
about them behind their backs and doing so publicly. Where in [therapy] I had been responsive to them,
now I [was] using their lives in the service of something else, for my own purposes, to show something
to others. I am guilty about being an intruder and then, to some extent, a betrayer” (“On Writing,” 4).
Thus, the patient who reads her own case may make the uncomfortable discovery that, in the
therapeutic relationship, her wellbeing was not an end in itself--or at least not the only end: she has
also been a means to an end. Whether she values that end may depend on what she takes it to be. If
she sees her case as being used to advance knowledge of her condition, she may decide her discomfort
is justified. If she sees the end as more careerist, she may not.
Those who write about illness and disability, then, should err on the side of caution. It may not be
enough to take the precaution of concealing a patient’s identity--or obtaining consent. The patient who
gives consent may have no idea what it will be like to come upon her story in alien discourse. It may be
advisable to assume that one’s patient will in fact read the narrative of her case and recognize it as her
own. And to write accordingly, if one writes at all. And not to write, if one imagines it will cause undue
discomfort.
As it happens, that story has an instructive kicker, or afterlife. Not long ago, Julia emailed me to say
that she now felt ready to write about her situation. She asked if she could she see what I had written.
I thought I had sent her my op-ed when it was published. Apparently I had not. So I sent it to her, and
she replied (in part) as follows: “I think that [your] article captures that invalidation of my feelings
rather perfectly, but not in a way that is self-aware. In other words, [your] article unconsciously
replicates the same single focus on an external goal, and lack of attention to internal processes and
family dynamics, that I felt during the therapeutic process” (personal communication).
I’m not entirely sure what she means about “internal processes and family dynamics,” since, unlike
her therapist, I was not privy to those nor to any of the details of her case. In fact, I don’t even know
what her original condition was. But in writing my piece, I was uncomfortably aware that I, too, was
treating it as a kind of case and putting it to my purposes. I saw no way around that, and I don’t regret
what I did with it. But I understand how Julia may feel I somehow reenacted her therapist’s appropriation
of her experience. My point is that writers cannot always foresee how far their words will travel and how
they may return to haunt them.
In writing Vulnerable Subjects, it occurred to me that the various principles of biomedical ethics
might be boiled down to one precept, known in the Judeo-Christian tradition as the Golden Rule: do
unto others as you would have others do unto you. That seems unobjectionable. But it’s not, because it
encourages a very dangerous ethical practice: assuming one knows what the other wants. Not only do
individuals vary in what they want, but desires may be inflected by gender, race, ethnicity and other
cultural attributes. This is one reason that diversity in the medical profession is so imperative.
But it may be that the bias hardest to overcome in medicine--and in medical discourse--is that against
illness itself. But how is this a bias? Isn’t the mission of medicine to heal the sick? Shouldn’t physicians
be against illness?
In a sense, yes, of course. This preference for health--to name it more neutrally--is inherent in
medical practice and rightly so. At the same time, it is increasingly obvious, to those paying attention,
that medicine operates inside, rather than outside, of cultural contexts. Most of the time, medicine’s
constructs work well enough. But medicine often encodes, and thus reinforces, common prejudices
against certain kinds of bodies.
Good evidence of this, if we needed it, appeared in a recent TED talk by Dr. Peter Attia, who,
according to a New York Times story, “admitted to something he believes many doctors may in fact be
guilty of. That compassion for overweight and obese patients often is not quite as deep as it is for those
who are sick for other reasons – the `unlucky’ ones, for instance, who develop cancer or another disease
through no apparent fault of their own” (O’Connor). Many viewers were moved by his apology to a
diabetic patient he admitted blaming for her condition. I would be more impressed by his apology had
it not been prompted by Dr. Attia’s own diagnosis with diabetes despite what he considered his very
healthy life style. In any case, Dr. Attia is not alone. The New York Times recently ran an article with
the title, “Why Do Obese Patients Get Worse Care? Many doctors Don’t See Beyond the Fat.”
The larger point here has been a theme of my work beginning with Recovering Bodies: Illness,
Disability, and Life Writing: certain somatic conditions come with stigmatizing narratives. In my lifetime,
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the most obvious example of this is, of course, HIV/AIDS. Initially, HIV/AIDS was considered a death
sentence, and the cultural narrative implied that many patients deserved their sickness and their death.
Hence the distinction between innocent and not-so-innocent victims, depending on how the virus was
acquired—whether by intravenous drug use or gay sex, on the one hand, or by transfusion or birth, on
the other. This stigma has been greatly diminished—fortunately, but not fortuitously, that is not by
chance. One factor was drug therapies that have made HIV/AIDS a survivable chronic condition. This
changes the narrative and reduces fear and stigma. But those advances were impelled in part by gay
activists: such is the interplay among culture, politics, and science. My point may be obvious, but let
me restate it: many illness and disability narratives are pre-inscribed by culture. Attentive writers—and
readers—of life writing need to be aware, and wary, of these preexisting scripts, which have great power
and inertia.
Hitherto, I have been using the terms illness and disability in tandem. Now, having raised the
question of a medical preference for health, I want to distinguish disability from illness. Admittedly, in
practice the two often overlap; they often coexist in the same bodies. Indeed, illness and disability have
reciprocal relations: each may cause the other. Moreover, for legal purposes, under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, many physical illnesses—like HIV/AIDS, cancer, and diabetes—and mental illnesses—
like schizophrenia and bipolar syndrome—count as disabilities. Thus, while illness and disability are
conceptually distinct, the ill and the disabled are not distinct populations, and the line between disability
and illness is not always clear.
But while it is very difficult to draw a sharp line between them—or even to articulate the difference—
there is a distinction, and it matters. It matters in part because the all-too-common conflation of
disability with illness necessarily engages the medical paradigm (with its preference for health and
wholeness). This paradigm hails, or interpellates, disabled people as sick and defective; it constructs
their conditions as requiring medical intervention, which is not always helpful or desired. This conflation
tends to pathologize disability, willy-nilly. It may project a desire for cure where it does not exist.
A related danger of conflating disability with illness lies in undervaluing the lives of disabled people.
Numerous studies have established that people with significant disabilities rate their own quality of life
nearly as high as that of nondisabled people. Many disabled people are surprisingly well adjusted to
their conditions, especially if their impairments are congenital or acquired early in life. In contrast,
nondisabled people, especially those who are medical professionals, typically estimate the quality of life
of disabled people as quite poor. Here, I think, we can begin to see the danger of the medical bias in
favor of health. Disabled people do not share, cannot understand, and are justifiably offended by the
attitude of nondisabled people that their lives may be of poor quality—or even not worth living. So there
is always a danger in writing about someone’s disability that the writer will project onto a subject his or
her own imagined response to being in that condition. The Golden Rule falls short.
A few years ago, the New York Times Magazine ran a cover article about Brooke Hopkins, an English
professor at the University of Utah, who became a high quadriplegic as a result of a terrible bicycle
accident (Marantz). The story’s hook was that he was married to a prominent bioethicist, Margaret Pabst
Battin, who had long been an advocate of assisted suicide: now her beloved husband was an apparent
candidate for that final solution. I always dread reading these stories, as they generally conclude that,
for the severely disabled, suicide is justified. This article reserved judgment; at the time of publication,
Hopkins was still alive and apparently holding his own. (He has since died.) I was heartened, however,
by his testimony that he loved his life—mostly (not every day)—and that “You never know what you can
get used to.” Indeed, you don’t. You can’t, until you have to.
Developments in the relatively new field of psychology called hedonics—the study of what pleases
us—lend the authority of behavioral science to disabled people’s reports of their quality of life
(Amundson). Medical professionals should respect these reports—whether they agree with them or not—
and to treat disabled people accordingly. Life writers—parents of disabled children, siblings of disabled
persons, children of disabled parents—should heed them as well. In fact, I have coined the term “qualityof-life writing” for narratives of illness and disability to recognize their role in affirming quality of life
where it may not be apparent to others.
My argument may seem rather negative; t certainly has been primarily cautionary, a series of
caveats.
•
Life writing can cause harm when consumed by the subject, even years in the future.
•
Life writing can violate the privacy of its subject.
•
Life writing can appropriate a subject’s story for ends that the subject may not value.
•
Life writing can project onto an ill or disabled subjects the emotions its authors think they would
feel in their situation; such “identification” can itself be invalid and harmful.
•
It is problematic to conflate illness and disability.
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But let me close by coming at these issues from a very different angle, drawn from my own life and
my own life writing. I was initially drawn into the field of Disability Studies by the proliferation of memoirs
by and about people with anomalous bodies. I was not consciously impelled by any personal experience.
Had you asked me twenty years ago, I would have said that neither I nor any member of my immediate
family was disabled. But I see now that in fact my family was riddled with disability; I just hadn’t thought
of it as such. I’ll spare you the details except for this: when I was in my late twenties, and he was in his
late sixties, my father died of depression—by way of self-medication with alcohol.
Over the last decade, I have worked on a memoir of him—an entirely unanticipated culmination of
years of working in the fields of life writing studies and disability studies. The memoir was provoked
mainly by personal documents I found in my father’s closet that revealed dimensions of his premarital
life of which I knew very little, and which I found fascinating. I thought that his life before he married
and had children was worthy of narration.
To complete the narrative, however, I felt I needed to tell the sad story of his final years. To that
end, I requested his medical records from McLean Hospital in Belmont, Massachusetts, where he had
been treated for depression, without apparent benefit. (That is the same prestigious institution where
Susannah Kaysen spent 18 months a few years before my father; a sojourn that was the subject of her
memoir Girl, Interrupted.) After filing all the requisite forms, I received a batch of documents more than
an inch thick. Much of this consisted of graphs of his electroshock therapy. These pages were of course
totally inscrutable, entirely useless to me. The written observations by healthcare workers—social
workers, nurses, and physicians—also supplied little in the way of insight into his psyche.
For over four months in his mid-sixties my father received the very best inpatient care that medicine
could provide and that money could buy at the time. Alas, there was no discernible improvement in his
condition, and a year after his discharge he died. What I learned from perusing his records several times
is something I should perhaps have known all along: the answer as to why my bright, accomplished,
vigorous father should succumb to a devastating depression in his early sixties was not to be found in
his medical records. Indeed, the psychiatrist who referred him to McLean admitted he found no
precipitating events. Nor did those who treated him while he was there.
I like to think that, using the documents and records available to me, and my personal knowledge of
him, I have come to a better understanding of his late-life depression than his careers did. I did this by
paying careful and sustained attention to the whole of his life course, with the benefit of documents not
available to his physicians.
Obviously, in doing so, I have been writing about a vulnerable subject. In so doing, I experienced
ethical questions firsthand, from the perspective of the memoirist, not the life writing scholar. The end
of my father’s life involved some very messy scenes. There is no question that he would not have wanted
some stories told. So I was somewhat perplexed about what was fair to include. There’s a vivid scene
in Philip Roth’s Patrimony in which he describes—in violation of a promise to his father—cleaning up
after his father had an episode of explosive diarrhea—shit everywhere. I sympathize with Roth’s
predicament: I’ve witnessed some awful messes myself, and I feel they are part of my story, too; mine
to share. So I sometimes question my own pronouncements about the ethics of life writing. Or at least,
I recognize how easy it was to render them from a critic’s, rather than a writer’s, perspective. The pen
is in my other hand, now.
Toward the end of the multi-year process of researching and composing this narrative—a process
that was painful but also deeply gratifying and therapeutic for me—I had a brainstorm. For a number of
reasons, it occurred to me that it might be appropriate to cast my memoir in the form of a long letter
to my father—to address it to him explicitly, referring to him in the second, rather than the third, person.
I rewrote the entire manuscript accordingly. On the advice of some readers, I abandoned this approach.
But rewriting the memoir in the second person was an edifying experience. For one thing, it gave me
the sensation of being in a new and direct relationship with my dear dead dad. It thus endowed the
memoir with a degree of intimacy earlier drafts lacked.
The second-person address also helped me gauge what I was doing insofar as it made me
acknowledge, to my father’s face, as it were, just what I was revealing about him to anonymous readers.
It feels different to address your narrative to your vulnerable subject. It’s a good reality check, which
may cause one to change one’s tone or even one’s content. I recommend this strategy to anyone writing
about a vulnerable subject. Don’t try to put yourself in their position, which in impossible; rather, try
telling their story to them. It may help you to question your own authority, and thus to earn it.
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